For his brave reporting at the San Jose Mercury
News, Webb paid a high price. He was attacked by journalistic colleagues
at the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the
American Journalism Review and even the Nation magazine. Under this
media pressure, his editor Jerry Ceppos sold out the story and demoted
Webb, causing him to quit the Mercury News. Even Webb’s marriage broke
up.
On Friday, Dec. 10, Gary Webb, 49, was found dead of an
apparent suicide, a gunshot wound to the head.
Whatever the details of Webb’s death, American
history owes him a huge debt. Though denigrated by much of the national
news media, Webb’s contra-cocaine series prompted internal
investigations by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Justice
Department, probes that confirmed that scores of contra units and
contra-connected individuals were implicated in the drug trade. The
probes also showed that the Reagan-Bush administration frustrated
investigations into those crimes for geopolitical reasons.
Failed Media
Unintentionally, Webb also exposed the cowardice
and unprofessional behavior that had become the new trademarks of the
major U.S. news media by the mid-1990s. The big news outlets were always
hot on the trail of some titillating scandal – the O.J. Simpson case or
the Monica Lewinsky scandal – but the major media could no longer
grapple with serious crimes of state.
Even after the CIA’s inspector general issued his
findings in 1998, the major newspapers could not muster the talent or
the courage to explain those extraordinary government admissions to the
American people. Nor did the big newspapers apologize for their unfair
treatment of Gary Webb. Foreshadowing the media incompetence that would
fail to challenge George W. Bush’s case for war with Iraq five years
later, the major news organizations effectively hid the CIA’s confession
from the American people.
The New York Times and the Washington Post never
got much past the CIA’s “executive summary,” which tried to put the best
spin on Inspector General Frederick Hitz’s findings. The Los Angeles
Times never even wrote a story after the final volume of the CIA’s
report was published, though Webb’s initial story had focused on
contra-connected cocaine shipments to South-Central Los Angeles.
The Los Angeles Times’ cover-up has now continued
after Webb’s death. In a harsh obituary about Webb, the Times reporter,
who called to interview me, ignored my comments about the debt the
nation owed Webb and the importance of the CIA’s inspector general
findings. Instead of using Webb’s death as an opportunity to finally get
the story straight, the Times acted as if there never had been an
official investigation confirming many of Webb’s allegations. [Los
Angeles Times, Dec. 12, 2004.]
By maintaining the contra-cocaine cover-up – even
after the CIA’s inspector general had admitted the facts – the big newspapers seemed to
have understood that they could avoid any consequences for their
egregious behavior in the 1990s or for their negligence toward the
contra-cocaine issue when it first surfaced in the 1980s. After all, the
conservative news media – the chief competitor to the mainstream press –
isn’t going to demand a reexamination of the crimes of the Reagan-Bush
years.
That means that only a few minor media outlets,
like our own Consortiumnews.com, will go back over the facts now, just
as only a few of us addressed the significance of the government
admissions in the late 1990s. I compiled and explained the findings of
the CIA/Justice investigations in my 1999 book, Lost History:
Contras, Cocaine, the Press & ‘Project Truth.’
Contra-Cocaine Case
Lost History, which took its name from a
series at this Web site, also describes how the contra-cocaine story
first reached the public in a story that Brian Barger and I wrote for
the Associated Press in December 1985. Though the big newspapers
pooh-poohed our discovery, Sen. John Kerry followed up our story with
his own groundbreaking investigation. For his efforts, Kerry also
encountered media ridicule. Newsweek dubbed the Massachusetts senator a
“randy conspiracy buff.” [For details, see Consortiumnews.com’s “Kerry’s
Contra-Cocaine Chapter.”]
So when Gary Webb revived the contra-cocaine issue
in August 1996 with a 20,000-word three-part series entitled “Dark
Alliance,” editors at major newspapers already had a powerful
self-interest to slap down a story that they had disparaged for the past
decade.
The challenge to their earlier judgments was doubly
painful because the Mercury-News’ sophisticated Web site ensured that
Webb’s series made a big splash on the Internet, which was just emerging
as a threat to the traditional news media. Also, the African-American
community was furious at the possibility that U.S. government policies
had contributed to the crack-cocaine epidemic.
In other words, the mostly white, male editors at
the major newspapers saw their preeminence in judging news challenged by
an upstart regional newspaper, the Internet and common American citizens
who also happened to be black. So, even as the CIA was prepared to
conduct a relatively thorough and honest investigation, the major
newspapers seemed more eager to protect their reputations and their
turf.
Without doubt, Webb’s series had its limitations.
It primarily tracked one West Coast network of contra-cocaine
traffickers from the early-to-mid 1980s. Webb connected that cocaine to
an early “crack” production network that supplied Los Angeles street
gangs, the Crips and the Bloods, leading to Webb’s conclusion that
contra cocaine fueled the early crack epidemic that devastated Los
Angeles and other U.S. cities.
Counterattack
When black leaders began demanding a full
investigation of these charges, the Washington media joined the
political Establishment in circling the wagons. It fell to Rev. Sun
Myung Moon’s right-wing Washington Times to begin the counterattack
against Webb’s series. The Washington Times turned to some former CIA
officials, who participated in the contra war, to refute the drug
charges.
But – in a pattern that would repeat itself on
other issues in the following years – the Washington Post and other
mainstream newspapers quickly lined up behind the conservative news
media. On Oct. 4, 1996, the Washington Post published a front-page
article knocking down Webb’s story.
The Post’s approach was twofold: first, it
presented the contra-cocaine allegations as old news – “even CIA
personnel testified to Congress they knew that those covert operations
involved drug traffickers,” the Post reported – and second, the Post
minimized the importance of the one contra smuggling channel that Webb
had highlighted – that it had not “played a major role in the emergence
of crack.” A Post side-bar story dismissed African-Americans as prone to
“conspiracy fears.”
Soon, the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times
joined in the piling on of Gary Webb. The big newspapers made much of
the CIA’s internal reviews in 1987 and 1988 that supposedly cleared the
spy agency of a role in contra-cocaine smuggling.
But the CIA's decade-old cover-up began to crumble on
Oct. 24, 1996, when CIA Inspector General Hitz conceded before the
Senate Intelligence Committee that the first CIA probe had lasted only
12 days, the second only three days. He promised a more thorough review.
Mocking Webb
Meanwhile, however, Gary Webb became the target of
outright media ridicule. Influential Post media critic Howard Kurtz
mocked Webb for saying in a book proposal that he would explore the
possibility that the contra war was primarily a business to its
participants. “Oliver Stone, check your voice mail,” Kurtz chortled.
[Washington Post, Oct. 28, 1996]
Webb’s suspicion was not unfounded, however.
Indeed, White House aide Oliver North’s emissary Rob Owen had made the
same point a decade earlier, in a March 17, 1986, message about the
contra leadership. “Few of the so-called leaders of the movement …
really care about the boys in the field,” Owen wrote. “THIS WAR HAS
BECOME A BUSINESS TO MANY OF THEM.” [Capitalization in the original.]
Nevertheless, the pillorying of Gary Webb was on,
in earnest. The ridicule also had a predictable effect on the executives
of the Mercury-News. By early 1997, executive editor Jerry Ceppos was in
retreat.
On May 11, 1997, Ceppos published a front-page
column saying the series “fell short of my standards.” He criticized the
stories because they “strongly implied CIA knowledge” of contra
connections to U.S. drug dealers who were manufacturing crack-cocaine.
“We did not have proof that top CIA officials knew of the relationship.”
The big newspapers celebrated Ceppos’s retreat as
vindication of their own dismissal of the contra-cocaine stories. Ceppos
next pulled the plug on the Mercury-News’ continuing contra-cocaine
investigation and reassigned Webb to a small office in Cupertino,
California, far from his family. Webb resigned the paper in disgrace.
For undercutting Webb and the other reporters
working on the contra investigation, Ceppos was lauded by the American
Journalism Review and was given the 1997 national “Ethics in Journalism
Award” by the Society of Professional Journalists. While Ceppos won
raves, Webb watched his career collapse and his marriage break up.
Probes Advance
Still, Gary Webb had set in motion internal
government investigations that would bring to the surface long-hidden
facts about how the Reagan-Bush administration had conducted the contra
war. The CIA’s defensive line against the contra-cocaine allegations
began to break when the spy agency published Volume One of Hitz’s
findings on Jan. 29, 1998.
Despite a largely exculpatory press release, Hitz’s
Volume One admitted that not only were many of Webb’s allegations true
but that he actually understated the seriousness of the contra-drug
crimes and the CIA’s knowledge. Hitz acknowledged that cocaine smugglers
played a significant early role in the Nicaraguan contra movement and
that the CIA intervened to block an image-threatening 1984 federal
investigation into a San Francisco-based drug ring with suspected ties
to the contras. [For details, see Robert Parry’s
Lost History: Contras, Cocaine, the Press & ‘Project Truth’]
On May 7, 1998, another disclosure from the
government investigation shook the CIA’s weakening defenses. Rep. Maxine
Waters, a California Democrat, introduced into the Congressional Record
a Feb. 11, 1982, letter of understanding between the CIA and the Justice
Department. The letter, which had been sought by CIA Director William
Casey, freed the CIA from legal requirements that it must report drug
smuggling by CIA assets, a provision that covered both the Nicaraguan
contras and Afghan rebels who were fighting a Soviet-supported regime in
Afghanistan.
Justice Report
Another crack in the defensive wall opened when the
Justice Department released a report by its inspector general, Michael
Bromwich. Given the hostile climate surrounding Webb’s series,
Bromwich’s report opened with criticism of Webb. But, like the CIA’s
Volume One, the contents revealed new details about government
wrongdoing.
According to evidence cited by the report, the
Reagan-Bush administration knew almost from the outset of the contra war
that cocaine traffickers permeated the paramilitary operation. The
administration also did next to nothing to expose or stop the criminal
activities. The report revealed example after example of leads not
followed, corroborated witnesses disparaged, official law-enforcement
investigations sabotaged, and even the CIA facilitating the work of drug
traffickers.
The Bromwich report showed that the contras and
their supporters ran several parallel drug-smuggling operations, not
just the one at the center of Webb’s series. The report also found that
the CIA shared little of its information about contra drugs with
law-enforcement agencies and on three occasions disrupted
cocaine-trafficking investigations that threatened the contras.
Though depicting a more widespread contra-drug
operation than Webb had understood, the Justice report also provided
some important corroboration about a Nicaraguan drug smuggler, Norwin
Meneses, who was a key figure in Webb’s series. Bromwich cited U.S.
government informants who supplied detailed information about Meneses’s
operation and his financial assistance to the contras.
For instance, Renato Pena, a money-and-drug courier
for Meneses, said that in the early 1980s, the CIA allowed the contras
to fly drugs into the United States, sell them and keep the proceeds.
Pena, who also was the northern California representative for the
CIA-backed FDN contra army, said the drug trafficking was forced on the
contras by the inadequate levels of U.S. government assistance.
The Justice report also disclosed repeated examples
of the CIA and U.S. embassies in Central America discouraging Drug
Enforcement Administration investigations, including one into alleged
contra-cocaine shipments moving through the airport in El Salvador. In
an understated conclusion, Inspector General Bromwich said secrecy
trumped all. “We have no
doubt that the CIA and the U.S. Embassy were not anxious for the DEA to
pursue its investigation at the airport,” he wrote.
CIA's Volume Two
Despite the remarkable admissions in the body of
these reports, the big newspapers showed no inclination to read beyond
the press releases and executive summaries. By fall 1998, official
Washington was obsessed with the Monica Lewinsky sex scandal, which made
it easier to ignore even more stunning contra-cocaine disclosures in the CIA's Volume
Two..
In Volume Two, published Oct. 8, 1998, CIA
Inspector General Hitz identified more than 50 contras and
contra-related entities implicated in the drug trade. He also detailed
how the Reagan-Bush administration had protected these drug operations
and frustrated federal investigations, which had threatened to expose
the crimes in the mid-1980s. Hitz even published evidence that drug
trafficking and money laundering tracked into Reagan’s National Security
Council where Oliver North oversaw the contra operations.
Hitz revealed, too, that the CIA placed an admitted
drug money launderer in charge of the Southern Front contras in Costa
Rica. Also, according to Hitz’s evidence, the second-in-command of
contra forces on the Northern Front in Honduras had escaped from a
Colombian prison where he was serving time for drug trafficking
In Volume Two, the CIA’s defense against Webb’s
series had shrunk to a tiny fig leaf: that the CIA did not conspire with
the contras to raise money through cocaine trafficking. But Hitz made
clear that the contra war took precedence over law enforcement and that
the CIA withheld evidence of contra crimes from the Justice Department,
the Congress and even the CIA’s own analytical division.
Hitz found in CIA files evidence that the spy
agency knew from the first days of the contra war that its new clients
were involved in the cocaine trade. According to a September 1981 cable
to CIA headquarters, one of the early contra groups, known as ADREN, had
decided to use drug trafficking as a financing mechanism. Two ADREN
members made the first delivery of drugs to Miami in July 1981, the CIA
cable reported.
ADREN’s leaders included Enrique Bermudez, who
emerged as the top contra military commander in the 1980s. Webb’s series
had identified Bermudez as giving the green light to contra fundraising
by drug trafficker Meneses. Hitz’s report added that that the CIA had
another Nicaraguan witness who implicated Bermudez in the drug trade in
1988.
Priorities
Besides tracing the evidence of contra-drug
trafficking through the decade-long contra war, the inspector general
interviewed senior CIA officers who acknowledged that they were aware of
the contra-drug problem but didn’t want its exposure to undermine the
struggle to overthrow the leftist Sandinista government.
According to Hitz, the CIA had “one overriding
priority: to oust the Sandinista government. … [CIA officers] were
determined that the various difficulties they encountered not be allowed
to prevent effective implementation of the contra program.” One CIA
field officer explained, “The focus was to get the job done, get the
support and win the war.”
Hitz also recounted complaints from CIA analysts
that CIA operations officers handling the contra war hid evidence of
contra-drug trafficking even from the CIA’s analytical division. Because
of the withheld evidence, the CIA analysts incorrectly concluded in the
mid-1980s that “only a handful of contras might have been involved in
drug trafficking.” That false assessment was passed on to Congress and
the major news organizations – serving as an important basis for
denouncing Gary Webb and his series in 1996.
Though Hitz’s report was an extraordinary admission
of institutional guilt by the CIA, it passed almost unnoticed by the big
newspapers.
Two days after Hitz’s report was posted at the
CIA’s Internet site, the New York Times did a brief article that
continued to deride Webb’s work, while acknowledging that the
contra-drug problem may indeed have been worse than earlier understood.
Several weeks later, the Washington Post weighed in with a similarly
superficial article. The Los Angeles Times never published a story on
the release of the CIA’s Volume Two.
Consequences
To this day, no editor or reporter who missed the
contra-drug story has been punished for his or her negligence. Indeed,
many of them are now top executives at their news organizations. On the
other hand, Gary Webb’s career never recovered.
At Webb’s death, however, it should be noted that
his great gift to American history was that he – along with angry
African-American citizens – forced the government to admit some of the
worst crimes ever condoned by any American administration: the
protection of drug smuggling into the United States as part of a covert
war against a country, Nicaragua, that represented no real threat to
Americans.
The truth was ugly. Certainly the major news
organizations would have come under criticism themselves if they had
done their job and laid out this troubling story to the American people.
Conservative defenders of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush would have
been sure to howl in protest.
But the real tragedy of Webb’s historic gift – and
of his life cut short – is that because of the major news media’s
callowness and cowardice, this dark chapter of the Reagan-Bush era
remains largely unknown to the American people.